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OBLIGATIONS OF THE WIFE
Four opinions in cases of the year under review contain hold-
ings or dicta relative to obligations of the wife. In Leon God-
chaux Clothing Co. v. Ruiz,1 according to the court's findings of
fact, the wife not only had purchased an expensive coat in her
own name, but had expressly stipulated that she was not repre-
senting her husband and that he was not to be considered obliged
by her purchase. Taking these findings of fact as true, there
can be no doubt the court acted correctly in deciding the husband
was not obligated personally and that the creditor could not
reach his or the community assets. It is true that according to
custom in Louisiana recognized by repeated decisions (though
not specifically as custom or on precisely the same legal basis)
it is presumed the husband has tacitly authorized the wife to
represent him in contracts ordinarily entrusted to wives for the
maintenance of home and family unless he effectively takes
steps to negate the presumption or terminate the authority once
given. There can be no presumption the wife is acting under
such a tacit mandate, however, in instances in which the wife
affirms she does not act in representation of the husband; and
in such instances the act of the wife can obligate none but her-
self.
The second decision, that in Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v.
Perry,2 contains dictum which misconceives and misconstrues
the above-mentioned custom with regard to the presumed tacit
mandate of the wife. The court used language to the effect that
any contract of the wife will be presumed made with the au-
thority of the husband. The judges cited Keyser v. James3 in
uttering their dictum, but that decision certainly does not sup-
port them, and they must have been misled by the much too
sweeping statement in the unofficial commercial reporter's
syllabus. Certainly no other decision has gone so far, and a
presumptive mandate in such terms in favor of the wife would
make her the alter ego of the husband in all things and therefore
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 179 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
2. 186 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
3. 153 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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violate the division of authority between husband and wife in
all matrimonial regimes.
The third and fourth decisions evidence opposite opinions on
essentially similar facts. In Midland Discount Co. v. Robichaux4
both husband and wife had co-signed a note in solido. Later the
husband petitioned for and was discharged in bankruptcy. Ap-
parently both creditor and the court assumed that the husband's
discharge had also discharged the wife. Certainly this was error.
If the wife co-signed the note she was obligated personally and
primarily to the creditor, even though as between the spouses
she may have been only the husband's surety. Commercial Credit
Plan, Inc. v. Perry,5 however, previously mentioned in connection
with another issue, decided correctly on this point, for it recog-
nized that the wife is personally and independently obligated
in such circumstances and that she is not discharged in bank-
ruptcy simply because her husband is discharged.
HUSBAND'S RECOVERY FOR DELICT
Under articles 2334 and 2404 it is implied that damages re-
covered for delicts and quasi delicts suffered by the husband
fall into the community of acquets and gains unless he is living
separate from her by reason of her fault constituting sufficient
cause for separation or divorce. On the other hand, under the
same articles recoveries by the wife for delicts and quasi delicts
are always her separate property. Talley v. Employers Mutual
Liability Ins. Co.0 presented facts in which the husband was
injured before termination of the community of acquets and
gains but recovered damages after its termination. The court
of appeal affirmed a lower court judgment making two awards,
one to "the community" for "personal injuries" sustained be-
tween the date of the delict and the termination of the com-
munity, and one to the husband "individually" for "permanent
injury to the lower lip, and future loss of earnings." Granted
that the legislation is guilty of unequal justice to husband and
wife in this matter of damages for delicts, it nevertheless must
be asked by what authority any sums for "injury to the lower
lip" or even for "future loss of earnings" - both being attribu-
table to a delict occurring during the community regime - can
4. 184 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
5. 186 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
6. 181 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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be considered the separate assets of the husband. The case,
nevertheless, points up the need for legislative reforms.
PENSIONS
In Scott v. Scott7 a pension payable to a wife-teacher under
the State Teachers Retirement System was said to be the sep-
arate asset of the wife, and therefore properly excluded from
the inventory of the community of assets and gains dissolved by
separation or divorce, even though over $4500 of her earnings
during marriage (and therefore community assets) had been
paid into the pension fund. The court, not being presented with
the issue, expressly refrained from deciding whether the hus-
band could recover half the payments made into the pension fund
from the wife's earnings.
The court based its conclusion that the pension itself was
separate property in part on the narrow and somewhat incon-
clusive ground that the statute on the pension system limits
members therein to "teachers." The court also drew an analogy
between a wife-pensioner under a plan into which community
funds have been paid and the wife who is irrevocable beneficiary
under an insurance policy issued on the husband's life and paid
for with community funds, observing that the jurisprudence
treats such wife-beneficiary as absolute owner of the policy.
This analogy too is inconclusive, for there is all the difference
in the world between an insurance policy paid for by the hus-
band, who is the administrator of the community of acquets and
gains, and a pension plan into which some community funds
are paid without his consent. Actually, the only legislation which
might be applied, the omnibus clause of article 2334, would result
in the pension being classified as a community asset; but cer-
tainly the omnibus clause was not written with pensions in mind
any more than it was intended to cover insurance policies, long
declared sui generis. Classification of pensions, therefore, is an
instance of the need to approach a new problem under principles
rather than rules, but the principles and their specification are
far from certain. If a pension has a social security purpose, it
would seem more fitting to regard the pension itself as the sep-
arate property of the husband or wife who earned it, but at
the same time to treat payments made pursuant to it as com-
munity assets if paid during a marriage to a pensioner living
7. 179 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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under the community regime. This is the conclusion enacted into
law in Spain in 18888 and in France under the marriage regime
reforms of 1965.0 The matter, however, deserves careful study
and eventual legislative regulation.
COMMINGLING OF SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY ASSETS
The jurisprudence of recent years has been more and more
sympathetic to the idea that a mingling of community and sep-
arate funds should not be deemed to convert the whole into
community funds if they can be separated by accounting methods
or other evidence. In the last year the Court of Appeal for the
Third Circuit has showed itself very sensitive to this new trend.10
THE COMMUNITY IN PUTATIVE MARRIAGE
The facts in Succession of Choyce" were that Frank Choyce
had abandoned his first wife and, without obtaining a divorce,
married a second time to one deemed to be in good faith. Choyce
had acquired a home after contracting the second marriage and
at his death the court awarded a one-half interest in it to each
wife. The judgment is correct so far as it goes if it is to be
assumed that the legal wife is entitled to benefits of the com-
munity of acquets and gains between her and Choyce; that the
putative second spouse was entitled to community rights against
Choyce under article 118 of the Civil Code; that the house,
having been acquired by Choyce, the common spouse, entered
both communities; and that if the common spouse is in bad faith
the expectancies of the legal and good faith spouses in their
proper communities should not be prejudiced. The record, how-
ever, as distinguished from the opinion on appeal, reveals that
the good faith second spouse had used her earnings to pay at
least many of the installments on the house. Frank Choyce,
nevertheless, because of his bad faith, would not have been en-
titled to claim the benefits of article 118 and that the earnings
of his good faith second wife had entered a community of acquets
and gains between them. Thus the good faith second spouse,
having used her separate funds to make payments on the price
of what as to her was a community asset, should have been
8. SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1403 (1888).
9. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1404, as amended by Law of July 13, 1965.
10. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 177 So. 2d 137 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Succession
of Joseph, 180 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Succession of Hollier, 184
So. 2d 790 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
11. 183 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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reimbursed one-half the amounts so paid, the amount correspond-
ing to the value she had contributed and which was not being
returned to her as an interest in the house. Beyond this, how-
ever, there is at least serious question whether the house should
have been deemed to form part of the community of acquets and
gains between Choyce and his legal wife. The opinion indicates
she herself ignored their marriage, assuming it to have been
terminated by divorce long before Choyce acquired the house.
Under such circumstances, certainly unforeseen by the legisla-
tion, it seems that article 21 of the Civil Code might be invoked
to deny her the benefits of the black-letter application of the
rules on marriage regimes.12
PARTITION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS BEFORE TERMINATION
OF REGIME
In Lloyd v. Register13 the court found as facts that a sale
of a community asset by a husband to his mother-in-law before
termination of the community of acquets and gains between
him and his wife was in fact (1) a simulated sale to his wife
and (2) made to effectuate a partition of community assets
before the regime had been terminated. The court decided the
transaction was an absolute nullity, assigning as its reason that
under articles 1790 and 2446 of the Civil Code husband and
wife have no capacity to sell to and buy from each other. Be
that as it may,14 the transaction was an absolute nullity, never-
theless, for an attempt to partition community assets before
termination of the regime constitutes a direct violation of article
12. See the author's remarks on Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128
(1956), 17 LA. L. REV. 303 (1957).
13. 184 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
14. Article 1790 contains the statement that interspousal contracts are for-
bidden, but this statement is not in itself a general rule; for the last sentence
in the article qualifies it by saying "These [instances of incapacity] take place
only in the cases specially provided by law, under different titles of this Code."
Moreover, whatever the extent of the interspousal contract prohibition in article
1790, a contract in violation of this rule only, and not some other as well, is only
a relative nullity, not an absolute nullity. Thus article 1795, in the same section
as article 1790, suggests ratification of the act is always possible when the cause
of the incapacity (marriage here) has ceased.
Nor is every sale or transfer between husband and wife in violation of article
2446 an absolute nullity. Thus a transfer to effect modification or termination
of the community of acquets and gains before separation from bed and board
would be an absolute nullity because it violates the rule of public order contained
in article 2329 forbidding modification of the marriage regime by convention; but
the husband's sale of his separate assets to his wife over eighteen years of age
purchasing them as separate assets would not violate article 2329 and would not
otherwise appear to be contrary to public order, and therefore would be only
relatively null under the rules of articles 1790 and 1795.
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2329, under which the matrimonial regime may not be altered
conventionally during marriage. The case in any event illustrates
the nullity of partitions of community assets before termination
of the regime, an all too frequent practice.' 5
OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
Although recovery on the theory of unjust enrichment has a
long and venerable history in the civil law, it still suffers from
lack of clarity. In Louisiana State Mineral Board v. Albarado,'
the court applied the principle and granted the relator (one of
the Boutte heirs in a very small amount) recovery in quantum
meruit to cover services rendered by him over a period of some
thirty years which inured to the benefit of all of the heirs. The
court of appeal had found inapplicable the so-called "fund" doc-
trine applied in the Interstate case,2 which permits recovery
from a fund by one whose efforts have been solely responsible
for its creation. It also found that relator had at all times acted
on the basis of contractual agreements entered into with some
of the heirs, and was motivated by the compensation provided
for therein. It did not count his action, therefore, as taken for
the benefit of all of the heirs so as to support recovery on the
theory of unjust enrichment. In the earlier case of Succession
of Kernan,3 attorneys who had succeeded in securing a judgment
invalidating a particular legacy were denied recovery against
other legatees who had refused to employ them. This holding
was apparently distinguished by the Supreme Court in the in-
stant case on the ground that the attorneys in Kernan rendered
15. When incorporated in judgments of separation or divorce, of course, the
provisions of such null conventional partitions become effective as judicial parti-
tions. They cannot be ratified as conventional partitions, for ratification would
render them effective as of the date on which they were made, a time at which
they were forbidden as a matter of public order. On the other hand, there is no
reason why the provisions of such null conventional partitions might not be in-
corporated into a new act entered into after separation or divorce and effective
as of its proper date.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 248 La. 551, 180 So. 2d 700 (1965).
2. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 235 La. 825, 106 So. 2d 276 (1958).
On this point the opinion of the Supreme Court was in accord.
3. 105 La. 592, 30 So. 239 (1901).
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